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Abstract
A simple model of cooperative information exchange between multiple participants
is dened, using propositional update semantics. The model is presented in the
form of a reduction system. Several properties of the system are proven, concerning
conuence, normalisation, properties of normal forms and reduction strategies. We
end by discussing possible applications and extensions.
1 Introduction
Dynamic semantics (in its broad sense) is characterized by the fact that (1)
the update eects of utterances plays a central role, and (2) there is a shift
of attention from individual sentences to discourse. For this reason, it lends
itself well as a basis for the formal analysis of the pragmatics of information
exchange dialogues. In this paper, we discuss a simple model of the \game of
cooperative information exchange", based on propositional update semantics.
As was suggested in [10], the model is formulated as an abstract reduction
system.
Our starting point is Stalnaker's theory of assertions. In making assertions,
people take some of their private information and make it common ground.
In terms of possible world semantics, they eliminate possibilities from the
common ground, which they know not to be the case [9].
At any point in a dialogue, people make choices concerning which informa-
tion to exchange (which possibilities to eliminate). Typically, there are many
alternatives to choose from. Notwithstanding this apparant divergence, there
is a clear direction in which the conversation proceeds. During the conver-
sation, the information states of the participants grow more and more alike.
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Fig. 1. Process of information exchange
This process converges to a (hypothetical) situation in which there is no infor-
mation left to communicate, i.e., all available information is common ground
(i.e., the information that used to be distributed between them). Of course,
this situation is never reached in practice.
2
If we assume for the moment that there are only two participants involved
in the information exchange, then these considerations are reected in Figure
1. The nodes of the graph represent states (i.e., Stalnakarian Contexts) and
the arrows represent possible utterances, being transitions from one state to
another.
The top three ovals together make up one state. In this state, the two
agents each have certain information, and certain information is common
ground between them.
3
At the \end state" (at the bottom of the picture)
all three circles coincide. This corresponds to the hypothetical state that we
discussed, in which each agent has the same information, and this information
is common ground.
4
In information exchange dialogues, the participants typically have a spe-
cic goal, e.g. to resolve a decision problem [15]. We can think of such a goal
as a set of states. Then, the outlined area in the bottom half of the picture
represents a possible goal (the goal being to reach one of these states).
Various pragmatic notions t in this picture. For instance, relevance can
be analysed as a strategy for achieving a goal. Intuitively, irrelevant utterances
are utterances that will not help you to achieve your goal. This idea is further
pursued in [11].
To formalise the picture of cooperative information exchange sketched here,
we will combine notions from update semantics [16] and abstract reduction
systems [8]. Abstract reduction systems (ARS's) form a eld of research in
2
This is an idealised model of information exchange. In practice, many complications arise
(misunderstandings, mistakes, lying, etc.) that we will not address.
3
The bigger circle corresponds to the common ground. This reects the fact that any
information that is common ground, is also private information of both agents.
4
It is important to realise that Figure 1 contains only part of the general picture: only
those states are depicted, that are reachable from the given starting state. The complete
picture would contain all possible states as well as all possible utterances.Anticipating the
discussion, in terms of reduction systems, Figure 1 gives the reduction graph of the state
represented by the top three ovals.
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theoretical computer science that is concerned with the reduction of terms or
more abstract objects to a normal form. Combinatory logic and the lambda-
calculus are the prime examples, but many other reduction systems have been
devised, e.g. for braids and knots. For a general introduction, the reader is
referred to [8] or [1].
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we will formulate a model of
cooperative information exchange, in the form of an ARS. Next, we will discuss
some of its properties, concerning conuence, normalisation and normal forms.
We will end with a discussion on possible applications and extensions.
2 Formulating the ARS
Dening an ARS involves two steps. First, one denes a set of objects and
second, one denes a number of reduction relations over these objects. In our
case, the objects will correspond to Stalnakerian \Contexts" or, as we will call
them here, states. A state species the information that each agent has, as
well as the information that is common ground between the agents.
We will keep things as simple as possible, and use ordinary propositional
logic as our language. Let P be a propositional alphabet and A a nite set
of agents. Let V be the set of all valuations over P . Then we dene states as
follows.
Denition 2.1 [States] A state is a function  : A [ fcg ! }(V ) such that
8a 2 A : (a)  (c).  is the set of all states.
The c in the denition refers to the common ground. Notice that it is
required that the common ground contains less information than each of the
participants has, which is a very natural requirement.
We will write  \  for a:((a) \ (a)) and    for 8a : (a)  (a).
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In order to dene the reduction relations, we need to introduce two cen-
tral notions from update semantics: support and update. These notions are
typically dened for individual information states. Here, we will reformulate
them in terms of our multi-agent states.
Denition 2.2 [Support]  
a
 if 8v 2 (a) : v j= 
This denition states that agent a supports  (\knows that ") in state
 whenever  is true in all the situations a considers possible (where  is a
propositional formula over the given alphabet P ).
Denition 2.3 [Update]  +  = a:fv 2 (a) j v j= g
According to this denition, when the agents update with a sentence ,
then all possibilities are eliminated in which  is not the case (from the private
5
This notation is justied by the fact that type-theoretically, the given denition is equiv-
alent to one in which a state is a relation between agents and possibilities.
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information states as well as from the common ground). It is easy to see that
the set of all states  is closed under arbitrary updates.
Having update and support at our disposal, we can dene the reduction
relations of our ARS. Each reduction step will correspond to the assertion of
a proposition by an agent.
Denition 2.4 [Reduction relations]
i. 
a:
 !  if  
a
 and  6
c
 and  =  + 
ii. 
a
 !  if 
a:
 !  for some 
iii.   !  if 
a
 !  for some a 2 A
In a sense, these reduction relations specify the rules of the game. They
specify when an agent can make an utterance and thereby reduce a state to
another state: an agent can only make an utterance if he knows the content
to be true, and it is not already common ground. The eect of the utterance
is a public update with this information.
6
The ARS that we will be concerned with in the rest of this paper is h; (
a
 !
)
a2A
i. Some notation conventions: let

 ! be any reduction relation. Then

 !

is the reexive closure of

 !.

 ! is the reexive, transitive closure of

 !. An object a is said to be in

 !-normal form if there is no b such that
a

 ! b. If a

 ! b and b is in normal form, then b is an

 !-normal form
of a. Whenever we talk about normal forms without mentioning a specic
reduction relation, then we mean  !-normal forms.
Notice that the normal forms of our reduction relation  !, being states
that cannot be reduced any further, are precisely the hypothetical states that
we discussed in the introduction (nobody has anything more to say).
3 Properties of the ARS
Having dened our ARS, we now turn to some of its properties. We will be
mainly concerned with conuence, normalisation and properties of the normal
forms (these are central concepts from the ARS theory).
Proposition 3.1
i.   !  =)   
ii. The following diagrams hold.
7
6
As one can see, the role of the common ground c is to prevent the agents from repeating
themselves. It is not possible to allow only utterances that are informative to some of the
agents, for the speaker of a sentence does not know precisely the information state of the
hearers. The only requirement that we can reasonably make is that when an utterance is
made, the speaker considers it possible that the utterance is informative to some of the
other agents. This is precisely what is done here, using the common ground.
7
The diagrams should be read as follows: given any situation conform the solid arrows,
we can extend it by drawing the dashed arrows. For instance, the second diagram says that
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(subcommutativity) (swap) (conuence of
a
 !) (con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iii. If  is in
a
 !-normal form and   !  then  is in
a
 !-normal form.
Proof. (i) and the rst two diagrams are straightforward. The other two
diagrams and (iii) follow by tiling with the rst two diagrams. 2
The last diagram of the above proposition tells us that  ! is conuent (or,
\has the Church-Rosser property"). This implies that any state has at most
one normal form. We will now investigate which states have such a normal
form, and what it looks like. If the propositional alphabet P is nite, then
the answer is as follows.
Proposition 3.2
i. If P is nite, then  ! is Strongly Normalising.
ii. If P is nite, then nf() = a:
T
b2A
(b)
iii. If P is nite, then  is in normal form i 8a 2 A : (a) = (c)
Proof.
i. If P is nite, then so is V . Then by Proposition 3.1(i), there can be no
innite reduction sequence.
ii. Let  = nf(). We must show that 8a : (a) =
T
b2A
(b).
[] Suppose v 62
T
b2A
(b). Then for some b, v 62 (b). Because P is
nite, every valuation can be described completely by a nite formula.
Let  be the complete description of v. Then  
b
:, so  
b
:. But we
know that  is a normal form, so it must hold that  
c
:. So, v 62 (c),
so v 62 (a).
[] Suppose v 2
T
b2A
(b). By induction on the length of the reduction
sequence from  to  , we can show that v 2
T
b2A
(b). From this it follows
that v 2 (a) for any a.
iii.  is in normal form i  = nf(). If P is nite, that means that  is in
normal form i 8a : (a) =
T
b2A
(b). This is equivalent to saying that
8a 2 A : (a) = (c).
2
In plain words, these results can be described as follows. If the propo-
sitional alphabet is nite, every state reduces to a normal form, and always
in a nite number of steps. This normal form is precisely the state in which
all all agents have the information that used to be distributed between them
for all states  and  , if 
a:
 !
b: 
 !  then 
b:! 
 !
a:
 !  .
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(i.e. the intersection of the old information states of the agents) and all this
information is also common ground.
However, this is all under the assumption that the propositional alphabet
is nite. In the general case, things are a bit more complicated. In general, we
do not have Strong Normalisation (in fact, some states might not even have a
normal form). This means that if the agents keep on exchanging information,
this process might go on forever. And even if the process ends in a normal
form, it is not guaranteed that in this nal situation, all the agents have the
same information. It might happen that one agent has more information then
another, but he cannot communicate this information, because the language is
not expressive enough (only nite sentences might be uttered). The following
example illustrates this.
Example 3.3 Let P = fp
n
j n 2 Ng and A = fa; bg. Furthermore, let state
 be such that (a) = (c) = V (i.e., all valuations) and (b) = fv 2 V j
v(p) = 1 for some p 2 Pg. Then  is in normal form, even though agent b has
more information then agent a.
In order to give precise characterisations of the normal forms of our system,
we need to introduce the auxiliary notion of saturation. This is dened in
terms of ultralters, cf. [3].
Denition 3.4 [Saturation] ^ = a:fv 2 V j 9u 2Uf(V ) : (a) 2 u & 8p 2
P : fw j w(p) = v(p)g 2 ug
Intuitively, ^ is a copy of  in which some information is lost (some worlds
are added to the information states of the agents). The information that
is lost, is precisely the inexpressible information that was causing us trouble.
Consequently, in ^, all information that is available to the agents is expressible
in the language.
Formally, ^ is the smallest saturated superset of . Furthermore, ^ is
equivalent to , in the sense that ^ 
a
 precisely if  
a
.
Proposition 3.5
i.   ^
ii. ^ is saturated (i.e., \nite satisability implies satisability")
iii. 8 :    &  is saturated =) ^  
iv. ^ 
a
 ()  
a

Proof.
i. Suppose v 2 (a). Let 
v
be the principal ultralter of v, i.e., fX  V j
v 2 Xg. Then (a) 2 
v
and 8p 2 P : fw j w(p) = v(p)g 2 
v
. Therefore,
v 2 ^(a).
ii. Suppose  is nitely satisable in ^(a). Then ffw j w j= g j  2 g [
f(a)g has the nite intersection property and can therefore be extended
to an ultralter u. Now let v be such that v(p) = 1 i fw j w(p) = 1g 2 u.
6
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Then v and u meet the specied requirements, and therefore v 2 ^(a).
Furthermore, v satises  (by induction on the length of the formulae in
).
iii. Suppose    and  is saturated. Suppose v 2 ^(a). Then by denition,
there is an ultralter u 2 Uf(V ) such that (a) 2 u and 8p 2 P : fw j
w(p) = v(p)g 2 u. Let  be the theory of v. Then  is satisable in ^(a).
Because we know that u has the nite intersection property, it follows by
induction on the formulae in  that  is nitely satisable in (a). But
we know that    , so then  is also nitely satisable in (a). And by
saturatedness of  ,  must be satisable in  . This can only be if v 2  .
iv. By induction on .
2
Using saturation, we can generalise our results to the case where P is
innite: if a state  has a normal form, then it is a:
 
(a) \
T
b2A
^(b)

.
However, as was already noted, there can be states which do not have a
normal form. In general, in the absence of normal forms, conal reduction
sequences can play a similar role, functioning as a kind of innitary version
of normal forms (cf. [7]). A reduction sequence a
1
 ! a
2
 ! a
3
 ! : : : is
called conal if it holds that 8b : a
1
 ! b =) 9i : b  ! a
i
. In our case,
we will show that any conal reduction sequence starting with  converges to
a:
 
(a) \
T
b2A
^(b)

.
Proposition 3.6
i. If  has a normal form, then nf() = a:
 
(a) \
T
b2A
^(b)

.
ii.  is in normal form i 8a 2 A : ^(a) = ^(c)
iii. If 
1
 ! 
2
 ! : : : is a conal reduction sequence, then
T
i

i
=
a:
 

1
(a) \
T
b2A
^
1
(b)

.
Proof.
i. Let  = nf(). I.e.,   !  and  is in normal form. We need to show
that 8a : (a) = (a) \
T
b2A
^(b).
[] Suppose v 2 (a). Then by Proposition 3.1(i), v 2 (a). Also
v 2 (c). Let  be the theory of v. Then  is satisable, and therefore
also nitely satisable, in (c). Take any agent b 2 A. Because  is in
normal form, we know that 8 :  
b
 =)  
c
. From this it follows
that  is also nitely satisable in (b). Then by Proposition 3.1(i),  is
also nitely satisable in (b). So,  is satisable in ^(b). This can only
be i v 2 ^(b).
[] By induction on the length of the reduction.
ii. [)] Suppose  is in normal form and v 2 ^(a). Let  be the theory of v.
Then  is nitely satisable in ^(a) and therefore also in (a). Because
 is in normal form, we have that 8 :  
a
 =)  
c
. So,  is also
nitely satisable in (c). But then,  is nitely satisable in ^(c) and
7
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therefore also satisable in ^(c). This can only be if v 2 ^(c).
[(] Suppose 8a 2 A : ^(a) = ^(c) and suppose  
a
. Then ^ 
a
.
But then also ^ 
c
, and then  
c
. So, we can conclude that 8a;  :
 
a
 =)  
c
. So  is in normal form.
iii. Suppose 
1
 ! 
2
 ! : : : is conal. We must show that 8a : (
T
i

i
)(a) =

1
(a) \
T
b2A
^
1
(b).
[] Suppose v 62 (a)\
T
b2A
^
1
(a). Then there are two cases. The rst
case is that v 62 
1
(a). In that case, trivially v 62 (
T
i

i
)(a). The second
case is that v 2 
1
(a) and v 62
T
b2A
^
1
(b). Then there must be some
b 2 A such that v 62 ^
1
(b). We know that v 2 
1
(c). Let  be the theory
of v.  is not satisable in ^
1
(b) and therefore also not nitely satisable
in ^
1
(b). So, there is a nite set 
0
  such that 
0
is not satisable in
^
1
(b). Let  be :^
 2
0
 . Then ^
1

b
 and therefore 
1

b
. But 
1
6
c
.
So, 
1
 ! (
1
+ ) and v 62 (
1
+ )(a). By conality and Proposition
3.1(i), v 62 
i
(a) for some i. So, v 62
T
i

i
.
[] By induction on i it can be shown that 8i8a : 
i
(a)\
T
b2A
^
i
(b)) =

1
(a) \
T
b2A
^
1
(b). Now suppose v 2 
1
(a) \
T
b2A
^
1
(b). Then it follows
that 8i : v 2 
i
(a). So, v 2 (
T
i

i
)(a).
2
Recapitulating, we have that if P is nite, then  ! is conal and every
state  has normal form a:
 
(a)\
T
b2A
^(b)

(which is, in that case, equal to
a:
T
b2A
(b)). Moreover, even if  does not have a normal form, any conal
reduction sequence starting with  does converge to a:
 
(a) \
T
b2A
^(b)

.
As we will see next, if P is countable, then for every state there is such a
conal reduction sequence. A fortiori, if the agents all follow certain strategies,
the resulting reduction sequence is guaranteed to be conal (which means
that any information that could be exchanged is exchanged at some point).
To make this claim precise, consider the following standard denition from
rewriting literature [8].
Denition 3.7 A sequential reduction strategy for

 ! is a map F such that

 = F() if  is in

 !-normal form, and



 ! F() otherwise.
Unlike the typical case in rewriting, we are concerned with several agents,
each of which has their own strategy. Therefore, we need to dene strategies
proles as tuples of strategies, one for each agent.
Denition 3.8 [Strategy proles] A strategy prole F is a tuple (F
a
)
a2A
such
that for each agent a 2 A, F
a
is a sequential reduction strategy for
a
 !.
We must also require that the strategy of one agent does not make reference
to the private information of another agent. Strategy proles that have this
property are called realistic.
8
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Denition 3.9 [Realistic strategy proles] A strategy prole F is realistic if
for all agents a 2 A and states ;  2  it holds that if (a) = (a) and
(c) = (c) then F
a
() = F
a
()
Essentially, a strategy prole is realistic if the individual stategies of the
players do not distinguish between states that should indistinguishable to them
(i.e., in which they have the same information).
Given that the agents follow a certain strategy prole and given a starting
state, we can ask ourselves what happens if the agents start to communicate
in accordance to their strategies. In general, the result will be a dialogue (that
is, a reduction sequence), but the precise outcome depends on the particular
system of turn taking that is used: although we know the strategies of the
individual players, we don't know yet which player is at turn when.
At this point, it seems most sensible to make only the minimal requirement
of fairness: every agent should have the oppurtunity to say something every
once in a while. So, we dene an F -dialogue to be a reduction sequence that
is both in accordance to F and fair.
Denition 3.10 [Dialogue] An F -dialogue is a reduction sequence 
1
 !

2
 ! : : : such that
i. 8i9a 2 A : 
i+1
= F
a
(
i
)
ii. 8a 2 A8i9j  i : either 
j+1
= F
a
(
j
) or 
j
is in
a
 !-normal form.
The rst of these two conditions species that the reduction sequence must
be in accordance to the strategy prole: every step is in accordance with the
strategy of some agent. The second condition expresses fairness: every agents
should say something every once in a while (unless he has nothing left to say).
Formally, the latter requirement says that for any agent and at any moment,
there should be a later moment at which the agent either makes an utterance
or has nothing left to say.
Let us call a strategy prole F conal if all F -dialogues are conal. Then
we can prove the following.
Proposition 3.11
i. If P is nite, then every strategy prole is conal.
ii. If P is countable, then there are conal realistic strategy proles.
Proof.
i. If P is nite, then  ! is SN, so every reduction sequence is nite. But
then any dialogue of any strategy prole must end in a normal form.
ii. If P is countable, then so is the set of all formulas over P . Let f be an
injective mapping from formulae to natural numbers. Now dene F
a
() =
 + , where  is the f -lowest formula such that  
a
 and  6
c
, or
F
a
() =  otherwise. Let F = (F
a
)
a2A
. We will show that every F -
dialogue is conal.
9
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
1
--

a:
-


i
?
?

1
--

a:
-


i
?
?

k
?
?

1
--

a:
-


i
?
?

k
?
?
a:
-


0
?
?

1
--

a:
-


i
?
?

k
?
?


(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2. Steps in the proof of conality
Suppose 
1
 ! 
2
 ! : : : is an F -dialogue. We must prove that for all
 , 
1
 !  =) 9i :   ! 
i
. We do this by induction on the length of
the reduction from 
1
to  . The base case (where 
1
= ) is trivial. Now
for the inductive step, suppose 
1
 !
a:
 !  . By applying the inductive
hypothesis, we have the situation depicted in Figure 2(a).
We know that  
a
, and so by monotonicity, 8j  i : 
j

a
.
We also know that either there is a j  i such that 
j
is in
a
 !-normal
form, or there are innitely many j  i's such that 
j+1
= F
a
(
j
). In the
rst case, let k = j. In the second case, as there are only nitely many
formulae  with f( )  f(), there must be a k such that 
k

c
. In
either case, we have a k such that 
k

c
 (cf. Figure 2(b)).
By tiling with the subcommutativity-diagram, we come to situation
2(c). But by construction, 
k

c
, so it cannot be the case that 
k
a:
 ! 
0
.
Therefore, 
k
= 
0
(cf. Figure 2(d)). This concludes our proof.
2
As a corrolary, we have that if P is countable, then for every state, there
is a conal reduction sequence: any fair dialogue in accordance with a conal
strategy prole will do.
8
4 Conclusion and discussion
Amodel of cooperative information exchange was introduced, based on update
semantics, as well as the theory of abstract reduction systems. The main
focus was on the formal properties of the model. We took a very simple
update semantics, namely one for propositional logic, where the worlds are
propositional valuations. Also, the update mechanism is very simple: even
when an assertion is made that contradicts the private information of some
agents, the agents will still update with the information, ending up in an
absurd information state. The reason for choosing such a naive model, was to
have a \technically clean" basic framework that has clear formal properties
and which is relatively easy to grasp. The model will serve as a basis for
future extensions that will turn it into a more realistic model of information
exchange.
8
As can be easily proven, F-dialogues exist for any strategy prole F and starting state.
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Various extensions present themselves. In [10] a start was already made
with a similar system on the basis of [5]'s QL, which is a predicate logical lan-
guage extended with questions. Also, attention has been directed to the theory
of dynamic epistemic semantics and public announcements [4,2]. At rst sight,
it seems quite straightforward to take the notion of public announcement and
turn it into an ARS similar to the one presented here. However, many com-
plications arise. One of the problems is that the resulting ARS is in general
not conuent.
9
This topic is presently being investigated further.
In [11], some preliminary results are reported on the application of the
present framework to the analysis of relevance. To this extent, a notion of
communicative goal is introduced, and a notion of success relating strategies
(or rather strategy proles) to goals. In principle, such an approach can also
be generalised to apply not only to assertions but also to questions, cf. [10].
Another possible application could be in the analysis of structural proper-
ties of strategies for dealing with inconsistent information (which also relates
to the use of corrective utterances in discourse, cf. [14,6,12]).
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the link between information ex-
change and rewriting becomes even more apparent when we shift from the
compositional/set-theoretic perspective of dynamic semantics to a more rep-
resentational (DRT-style) one. In the latter case, information state are no
longer sets of possible worlds, but rather formulas or DRT's. If we would
proceed in this way, then our ARS starts to look much more like an actual
term-rewriting system.
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